US-Russia START treaty has a real but pretty modest target vis-à-vis the Cold War days, says Saurabh Kumar Shahi
Prague was indeed a good photo-op. Who does not like to see the presidents of the US and Russia going gung-ho about cutting down their respective strategic nuclear forces? However, amidst all the euphoria, the point missing is that the cut is modest at the best. In fact, according to the documents posted by the National Security Archive, Washington, DC, the cuts suggested that Prague is ambitious than Jimmy Carter’s much touted “deep cuts” of the SALT II proposal in 1977 and pretty comparable to 1950s “finite deterrence” target masterminded by the then US’ Chief of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke; the cut is ridiculously lower than the one suggested by then Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara in 1964. This proposal of McNamara had the blessings of John F Kennedy. However, before the proposal was even discussed within the US’ army and administration top brasses, Kennedy got killed. His successor, President Lyndon Baines Johnson, did show enthusiasm for the time being, but things did not materialise as planned. Mind you, this proposal came on the hills of Cuban Missile Crisis when the relationship between the Soviets and the Americans were at all time low. A similar proposal floated by President Reagan during ‘Star Wars’ days, had talked about “the zero nuclear forces in 10 years”. Imagine, it came from the same person who was being pegged, along with General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and others, as the “ten men standing between Reds and the free world”. But again, this paranoia was kept out of the nuclear deliberations.
Let’s take a look on Burke’s proposal first. His conception of a “finite deterrent” force suggested that as many as 45 Polaris submarines, with 720 submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], of which 400, or 55 per cent, would be on patrol. (Although he used the words “on station”) However, McNamara’s proposal was more balanced and was suggested keeping every equation in mind. He put forward a force of 400 strategic warheads, each of one megaton capacity adequate for the crucial “assured destruction” deterrence undertaking. While talking about the “destructive potential of US attacks on Soviet cities,” McNamara had the view that a force of 400 weaponised nuclear missiles, most likely of the capacity of one megaton each, was sufficient to wipe out “nearly 30 per cent of the population of the entire nation” and “almost three-fourths of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union.” A decade and a half later, McNamara still held his ground and wrote in an informal proposal that “less than five hundred” was sufficient for deterrence. His proposal found resonance with President Jimmy Carter who notched up by mulling over the leeway of substantial cuts bringing both the US and Soviet strategic forces to as low as 200-250 strategic delivery systems.
Therefore, what was achieved in Prague can merely be termed modest. However, these two nations still have a long way to go.
Prague was indeed a good photo-op. Who does not like to see the presidents of the US and Russia going gung-ho about cutting down their respective strategic nuclear forces? However, amidst all the euphoria, the point missing is that the cut is modest at the best. In fact, according to the documents posted by the National Security Archive, Washington, DC, the cuts suggested that Prague is ambitious than Jimmy Carter’s much touted “deep cuts” of the SALT II proposal in 1977 and pretty comparable to 1950s “finite deterrence” target masterminded by the then US’ Chief of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke; the cut is ridiculously lower than the one suggested by then Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara in 1964. This proposal of McNamara had the blessings of John F Kennedy. However, before the proposal was even discussed within the US’ army and administration top brasses, Kennedy got killed. His successor, President Lyndon Baines Johnson, did show enthusiasm for the time being, but things did not materialise as planned. Mind you, this proposal came on the hills of Cuban Missile Crisis when the relationship between the Soviets and the Americans were at all time low. A similar proposal floated by President Reagan during ‘Star Wars’ days, had talked about “the zero nuclear forces in 10 years”. Imagine, it came from the same person who was being pegged, along with General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and others, as the “ten men standing between Reds and the free world”. But again, this paranoia was kept out of the nuclear deliberations.
Let’s take a look on Burke’s proposal first. His conception of a “finite deterrent” force suggested that as many as 45 Polaris submarines, with 720 submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], of which 400, or 55 per cent, would be on patrol. (Although he used the words “on station”) However, McNamara’s proposal was more balanced and was suggested keeping every equation in mind. He put forward a force of 400 strategic warheads, each of one megaton capacity adequate for the crucial “assured destruction” deterrence undertaking. While talking about the “destructive potential of US attacks on Soviet cities,” McNamara had the view that a force of 400 weaponised nuclear missiles, most likely of the capacity of one megaton each, was sufficient to wipe out “nearly 30 per cent of the population of the entire nation” and “almost three-fourths of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union.” A decade and a half later, McNamara still held his ground and wrote in an informal proposal that “less than five hundred” was sufficient for deterrence. His proposal found resonance with President Jimmy Carter who notched up by mulling over the leeway of substantial cuts bringing both the US and Soviet strategic forces to as low as 200-250 strategic delivery systems.
Therefore, what was achieved in Prague can merely be termed modest. However, these two nations still have a long way to go.
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